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United States Supreme Court Justices undoubtedly accept the prevail-
ing notion that the American legal system functions as an instrument
for attaining socially desired ends.' And surely they would agree with
Karl Llewellyn's prescription that judges in resolving justiciable contro-
versies ought to "see and weigh first the relevant problem-situation as a
type, holding meanwhile so far as may be in suspense [their] reactions
to the fireside equities or to other possibly unique attributes of the case
in hand. ' 2
Llewellyn's approach seeks to reach a just decision, reflected in an
opinion articulating a rule of "singing reason."3 Stated another way, a
decision should represent "both a right situation-reason and a clear
scope-criterion on its face [yielding] . ..regularity, reckonability and
justice."'4
The United States Supreme Court's memorandum opinion prac-
tice fails to satisfy these ideals. To the contrary, it appears as though
the Court, when summarily affirming or dismissing an appeal, follows
the advice once given by Lord Mansfield to an army officer. The officer,
just appointed governor of a West India island, was concerned about
* Dean, Center for the Study of Law, Nova University; J.S.D., Columbia Univer-
sity School of Law, 1970.
1. This is, of course, nothing new. Justice Cardozo in 1921 observed that "[flew
rules in our time are so well established that they may not be called upon any day to
justify their existence as a means adapted to an end." B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98 (1921). See also Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.
L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
2. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 268
(1960).
3. Id. at 183.
4. Id.
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his ability to sit as a chancellor and to decide cases. Lord Mansfield
soothed the new governor's fears with this counsel:
Be of good cheer-take my advice, and you will be reckoned a great
judge as well as a great commander-in-chief. Nothing is more easy; only
hear both sides patiently-then consider what you think justice requires,
and decide accordingly. But never give your reasons;-for your judgment
will probably be right, but your reasons will certainly be wrong.'
But justification and elaboration are expected in a mature legal
system.' An opinion must explicate the ratio decidendi to provide-if
not a rule of "singing reason"-at least some rule to ensure that the
Court has acted on principle rather than "fireside equities." When the
Court provides opinions demonstrating that the resolution of an issue is
at least partially the product of principled7 and reasoned 8 decision
making, we are reassured that rules of law do play a role in the judicial
process.
By writing opinions demonstrating that the judgment is the result of
principled and reasoned decisionmaking-not a mental toss of
dice-judges retain and exhibit their objectivity, enhancing the prestige
of the legal process and reenforcing the consensus of legitimacy, the
main source of power for courts in a strong legal system, i.e., a legal
system that is 'the product of a . . . substantial consensus and . . . will-
5. 3 J. CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 481 (3d ed.
1874).
6. On justification and judicial decision making, see R. WASSERSTROM, THE JU-
DICIAL DECISION 172-73 (1961).
7. "Briefly put, the requirements for principled decision are: (1) that a reason for
the disposition of the case be given; and (2) that the case be so decided because it is
held to be proper to decide cases of its type in this way." Golding, Principled Decision-
Making and the Supreme Court, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 35, 41 (1963).
8. "Reasoned" decision is more inclusive than decision "on principle" and
has more meaning in administrative context. We forget sometimes that
"arbitrary" action can be either an unjustified departure from general pol-
icy or an undiscriminating and unjust application of general policy to a
concrete situation within its letter but not within its spirit.
Jones, The Rule of Law and the Welfare State, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 143, 145 n.5
(1958).
2
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ing obedience' rather than the product of coerced submission.9
Obviously, if promulgation of a rule does not occur, then law "as a
guide to conduct is reduced to the level of mere futility [because] it is
unknown and unknowable."1 0
The thesis advanced in this article is that the federal question
memorandum opinion practice of the Court comes close to creating un-
knowable law.
A species of memorandum opinions exists that ostensibly complies
with the minimum requirements of reasoned elaboration. These deci-
sions affirm or reverse a case by merely citing a prior controlling prece-
dent."' The Court has indicated that these determinations are on the
merits, unlike denials of certiorari, and thus binding on lower courts.1 2
In fact, the Court itself sometimes cites these summary dispositions as
authority. 3 More often, however, such decisions simply are ignored.
The Court's summary affirmance in Adams Newark Theater Co. v.
City of Newark14 illustrates the lack of respect accorded to such mem-
orandum opinions.
Adams involved an appeal from a conviction for violation of an
9. Lewis, The High Court: Final ... But Fallible, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
528, 548 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
10. B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 3 (1924).
11. The potential for disagreement as to whether a prior decision is controlling
was most evident in the opinions in Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246 (1959) and Ohio v.
Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960). For the denouement, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967). But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
12. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974).
13. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 450 (1967), citing as dispositive
Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958). Summerfield is frequently
cited. See, e.g., California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 116 (1972). Summerfield was a
memorandum opinion that reversed the lower court, merely citing Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
14. 354 U.S. 931 (1957), rehearing denied, 355 U.S. 851 (1957). The Court
cited as dispositive Alberts v. California, 352 U.S. 962 (1957), Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown, 352 U.S. 962 (1957), and Roth v. United States, 352 U.S. 964 (1957). The
Court cites to its grants of certiorari and notation of probable jurisdiction and not to
the actual disposition of the cases. For those, see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957). Justice Warren would
have set Adams for argument. Justices Black and Douglas dissented, and Justice Bren-
nan did not participate in the decision.
3
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ordinance of Newark, New Jersey, which, inter alia, prohibited lewd
dancing. 5 The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the conviction,
even though it found that theatrical performances, including the bur-
lesque show involved, fell within the protective ambit of the first
amendment.' 6
When the Supreme Court subsequently dealt with other cases in-
volving ordinances proscribing topless dancing (California v. LaRue"7
and Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc."8), it never mentioned Adams, although a
California decision cited in LaRue had cited in its opinion the New
Jersey Supreme Court Adams opinion.' 9 *
The lack of attention given to the Court's memorandum opinions
becomes clearer when one discovers that the California court that had
cited the New Jersey Supreme Court opinion failed to note by citation
or otherwise that Adams was affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court. 0
The slighting of Adams does not illustrate an isolated instance. In
at least nine other state and federal opinions, the New Jersey Supreme
Court decision is cited with no reference to the Court's affirmance.2
15. The relevant portions of the ordinance, NEWARK, N.J., REV. ORDINANCES
ch. 8, art. XIV, §8 (1955), are set forth in Adams Newark Theater Co. v. City of
Newark, 22 N.J. 472, 475, 126 A.2d 340, 341-42 (1956), aff'd 354 U.S. 931 (1957).
16. 22 N.J. at 475, 126 A.2d at 342.
17. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
18. 422 U.S. 922 (1975).
19. The case cited by the Court in LaRue is In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446
P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1969). See LaRue,
409 U.S. at 130.
20. See In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 567 n.1, 446 P.2d 535, 539 n.1, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 655, 659 n.1, (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 910 (1969).
21. Kirzenbaum v. Paulus, 51 N.J. Super. 186, 196, 144 A.2d 25, 31 (1958),
affd, 57 N.J. Super. 80, 153 A.2d 847 (1959); State v. Congdon, 76 N.J. Super. 493,
503, 185 A.2d 21, 30 (1962); Silco Automatic Vending Co. v. Puma, 105 N.J. Super.
72, 93, 251 A.2d 147, 158 (1969), rev'd, 108 N.J. Super. 427, 261 A.2d 174 (1970);
State v. Shapiro, 122 N.J. Super. 409, 420, 300 A.2d 595, 601 (1973); Gardens v. City
of Passaic, 130 N.J. Super. 369, 327 A.2d 250, 256 (1974), affid sub nom Iafelice v.
City of Passaic, 141 N.J. Super. 436, 358 A.2d 805 (1976); Paramount Film Distribut-
ing Corp. v. City of Chicago, 172 F. Supp. 69, 70 n.4 (N.D. 11. 1959); Hudson v.
United States, 234 A.2d 903, 905 n.4 (D.C. 1967); Maryland State Bd. of Motion
Picture Censors v. Times Film Corp., 212 Md. 454, 129 A.2d 833, 835 (1957); Major
Liquors, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 188 Neb. 628, 198 N.W.2d 483, 486 (1972).
I
1 14 Nova Law Journal 5:1980 1
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Accordingly, the summary disposition in Adams, in its most favorable
light, could be described as a judicial derelict on the legal seas. 22
Even if other courts took cognizance of the Adams memorandum
affirmance, would reference to a prior Court decision provide more
than a judicial Rorschach? Every jurist knows how difficult it is to as-
certain the holding of a case.23
Julius Stone suggests that use of prior precedents is a complex
process in which judges,
by linking instant cases with precedents, and elaborating, by resort to
rhetorical arguments, [generate] fresh solutions in single cases. In these
parts the legal system is 'open,' in the sense that it does not offer
mechanical keys to determinate solutions. This . . . does not mean that
choice is at large, or that decisions may not command some degree of
conviction springing from their anchorage in the topot, the truths taken
as common grounds for the time being. 24
Thus, it is not surprising to find that even when courts attempt to
22. The metaphor was suggested by Justice Frankfurter's comment concerning
the status of Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916), given
the Court's decision in Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Ry. Co., 342 U.S. 359
(1952). Justice Frankfurter wrote: "the Bombolis case should be overruled explicitly
instead of left as a derelict bound to occasion collisions on the waters of the law." 342
U.S. at 368-69 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in Dice).
23. Sometimes there is no such principle. See, e.g., National Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949). Or, with blocs on the Court, the holding
requires addition of various principles to which a majority would accede. See, e.g.,
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); Carey v. Population Seres. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
What constitutes a "fact" is itself an extremely complex question. See W. PROBERT,
LAW, LANGUAGE AND COMMUNICATION 299-301 (1972); H. HART & A. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 369-85
(10th ed. 1958).
24. J. Stone, Reasons and Reasoning in Judicial and Juristic Argument, 18
RUTGERS L. REV. 757, 775 (1964). It also is interesting that T. Kuhn has analogized
conceptual innovations in science to the judicial process: "In a science . . . a paradigm
is rarely an object for replication. Instead, like an accepted judicial decision in the
common law, it is an object for further articulation and specification under new or
more stringent conditions." T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 23
(1962). This parallel is discussed at length in Lewis, Systems Theory and Judicial
Behavioralism, 21 CASE W. RS. L. REV. 361, 415-42 (1970).
15 1
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apply prior precedents cited by the Court in summary decisions, little
guidance is available.25 One particular circumstance demonstrates viv-
idly how the Court's memorandum practice fails to communicate effec-
tively the ratio decidendi of a case.
When the Court reverses and remands a case, merely citing an
earlier decision as controlling, a lower court may, instead of following
the Supreme Court's actual message, simply distinguish the case. This
misreading forces the Court to again reverse summarily.28 The lack of
communication in this situation is evident. McLeod v. Ohio27 illustrates
well this Sisyphean process.
In McLeod, the record showed the appellant/accused had made
incriminating statements while voluntarily helping the police to secure
relevant evidence. Although then indicted, he had not been arraigned
and had not requested nor retained counsel. Nor were the incriminating
statements the product of trickery.
25. A clear illustration is provided by the memorandum opinion in United States
v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 9 (1966). In that case, the doctrine of Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
I 11 (1942), was apparently extended to situations with no substantial impact on inter-
state commerce. Although the lower court did an excellent job of distinguishing Wick-
ard (see 354 F.2d at 555-56), the Court, in reversing, merely cited Wickard. United
States v. Ohio is probably overruled sub silentio by National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976). But who really knows? And how many have even considered the
question, given the obscure status of such summary affirmances? The issue explicitly
left unanswered in Usery-whether state sovereignty acts as a limitation on federal
spending power (see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 n.17
(1976))-was resolved by the Court in North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 435
U.S. 962 (1978), in what Professor Tribe describes as an "unceremonious summary
affirmance." L. TRIBE, 1979 SUPPLEMENT TO AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18
(1979). The Court dealt indecisively with the same issue relative to the federal taxing
power in Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
26. See, e.g., Doughty v. Maxwell, 372 U.S. 781, 781 (1963), "remanded for
further consideration in light of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962)." On re-
mand, the state court distinguished Gideon and adhered to its original judgment.
Doughty v. Sacks, 175 Ohio St. 46, 191 N.E.2d 727 (1963). The Court then reversed
in Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964), citing Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506
(1962) and Gideon. See also O'Connor v. Ohio, 382 U.S. 286 (1965) (reversed and
remanded). On remand, the conviction was affirmed. State v. O'Connor, 6 Ohio St. 2d
169, 217 N.E.2d 685 (1966). On appeal, the Supreme Court again reversed. O'Connor
v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92 (1966). See also Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538 (1967), on re-
mand, 223 Ga. 465, 156 S.E.2d 65 (1967), rev'd by the Court in 389 U.S. 404 (1967).
27. 381 U.S. 356 (1965).
6
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These factors distinguish McLeod's situation sharply from that in-
volved in Massiah v. United States.28 In that case, the incriminating
admissions of the accused were elicited by trickery and subsequent to
both indictment and arraignment for the federal crime involved and
after counsel had been retained. Indeed, the Court in Massiah ap-
peared to limit its decision to its facts by stating that "[a]ll that we
hold is that the defendant's own incriminating statements, obtained by
federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not consti-
tutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his
[federal] trial."29
The curious concatenation of affirmances and reversals occurred as
follows: The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed McLeod's conviction,"0 and
the Court reversed and remanded to the Ohio court "for consideration
in light of Massiah v. United States .. ." The Ohio Supreme Court
affirmed McLeod's conviction again, finding that "the 'circumstances'
under which his incriminating statements were given were wholly dif-
ferent from those in Massiah."3 2 Finally, the United States Supreme
Court reversed with the unilluminating statement: "The judgment is
reversed. Massiah v. United States. .. ."3 This is perhaps another
demonstration of the extraordinary facility with which a legal mind can
think of something else without thinking of that to which it is
connected.34
If memorandum opinions such as McLeod constitute judicial Ror-
28. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
29. Id. at 207 (emphasis deleted).
30. 173 Ohio St. 520, 184 N.E.2d 101 (1962). Actually, the conviction was af-
firmed when the appeal was dismissed "for the reason that no debatable constitutional
question is involved." Id. at 520, 184 N.E.2d at 101. Apparently, the Ohio Supreme
Court has learned something from the United States Supreme Court.
31. 378 U.S. 582 (1964) (citations omitted).
32. 1 Ohio St. 60, 62-63, 203 N.E.2d 349, 351 (1964).
33. 381 U.S. 356 (1965) (citation omitted).
34. See Auerbach, A Plague of Lawyers, HARPER'S MAGAZINE 37, 42 (Oct.
1976). See also Von Jhering, Im Juristischen Begriffshimmel, READINGS IN JURISPRU-
DENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 678, 681 (M. Cohen & F. Cohen eds. 1951), in which
Von Jhering made the judicial application when he posited a test for admission to the
heaven of juristic concepts that required the applicant to display "ability to construe a
legal institution without regard to its real practical significance, but purely on the basis
of the concept itself or its original sources."
7
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schachs, then memorandum opinions dismissing appeals for lack of a
substantial federal question are the pages sans blot because these opin-
ions set forth no precedent. However, the difference is not merely one
of degree, but of kind. At least in summary affirmances and reversals,
the Court finds that there is sufficient disagreement about the merits of
the federal question presented to require citation to an applicable case.
But this is not so where the question is deemed insubstantial.
If a plaintiff attempts to invoke federal jurisdiction in a district
court but his claim is deemed insubstantial, no case or controversy ex-
ists and the case is necessarily dismissed--obviously a decision not on
the merits and without precedential effect. As the high Court has in-
structed lower courts:
Over the years this Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are
without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if
they are "so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of
merit" . . . ; "wholly insubstantial" . . . ; "obviously frivolous" . . .;
"plainly unsubstantial" . . .; or "no longer open to discussion". . . .One
of the principal decisions on the subject, Ex parte Poresky ...held,
first, that "[i]n the absence of diversity of citizenship, it is essential to
jurisdiction that a substantial federal question be presented. . ...35
We can readily perceive how the Court could conclude that frivo-
lous claims fail to present the type of federal questions required to sat-
isfy the case or controversy article III jurisdictional requisite.36
35. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (citations omitted).
36. United States ex rel Mayo v. Satan, 54 F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa. 1971), pro-
vides an amusing illustration of a frivolous action. There the plaintiff instituted a civil
rights action against Satan for causing the plaintiff misery and placing deliberate ob-
stacles in his path which led to his downfall. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion over the person of Satan. The Supreme Court has frequently indicated that frivo-
lous claims will not support federal jurisdiction. Early cases to that effect include:
Wynn v. Morris, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 3 (1857); Millingar v. Hartupee, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 258, 261 (1867); New Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works Co., 142 U.S. 79
(1891); Hamblin v. Western Land Co., 147 U.S. 531, 532 (1893); Wilson v. North
Carolina, 169 U.S. 586, 595 (1898); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Brown, 187
U.S. 308, 311 (1902). In Millingar v. Hartupee, the language the Court used was
particularly revealing. It dismissed a suit for lack of jurisdiction because "[s]omething
more than a bare assertion of [the federal question] .. .seems essential to the jurisdic-
tion of this Court." Id. at 261. See discussion in Ulman & Spears, Dismissed for Want
1 18 Nova Law Journal
5:19801
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The issue is more complex where the federal question supporting
jurisdiction is arguably insubstantial because it is not open to discus-
sion, i.e., its resolution is a Hobson's choice.3 7 The Heraclitean assump-
tion that the only constancy is change appears to hold with considera-
ble vigor in judicial decision making. Is any resolution by the Court
totally foreclosed from review? The Court has frequently observed that
stare decisis has less force where constitutional interpretation is re-
quired; after all the Court "must never forget, that it is a constitution
. . . [it is] expounding. ' ' 8
A striking example was provided when the Court, after deciding
and publishing its opinion involving court martial jurisdiction over civil-
ians, reversed itself and published a new opinion on rehearing the fol-
lowing term.39
of a Substantial Federal Question, 20 B.L. REv. 501 (1940). The authors note that
"[1]ater cases point to this remark as the first statement of the doctrine that a substan-
tial federal question is a prerequisite of Supreme Court jurisdiction in appeals from
state courts." Id. at 507. There are cases in which the Court did summarily affirm, but
the applicable prior precedents are discussed. See, e.g., Penna Co. v. Donat, 239 U.S.
50, 51-52 (1915).
37. The early cases dealing with insubstantiality by virtue of the certainty of the
relevant rule are cited under the "Rule of Precedents" in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT REPORTS 309 n.42 (1908).
38. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). Justice Bran-
deis also commented incisively on the role of stare decisis in constitutional
interpretation:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more impor-
tant that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be right .... This is
commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, provided
correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving the Federal Constitu-
tion, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this
Court has often overruled its earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of
experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial
and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial
function.
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissent-
ing) (citation omitted).
39. See Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487
(1956), on rehearing, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). Of course, a change in the Court's personnel
had occurred, not an unanticipated recurring event. Individual justices do, of course,
reverse themselves. Consider, for example, Justice Black's change of position in West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), from his earlier stance in
!
1- 5:1980
191
9
Lewis: Is The Supreme Court Creating Unknown And Unknowable Law? The Ins
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
20 Nova Law Journal 5:1980 1
Accepting the Court's conclusion that there are federal questions
so settled as properly characterized, along with frivolous claims, as too
insubstantial to support jurisdiction in a district court, then it follows
that the same doctrine should apply to cases where appellate jurisdic-
tion is invoked on the basis of a federal question properly raised. At
least since Marbury v. Madison'40 the Court has considered itself as
constrained as other federal article III courts by the article III case or
controversy strictures. Thus, if the party attempting to invoke the ap-
pellate jurisdiction of an article III court presents as the basis for juris-
diction only an insubstantial federal question, the appeal should be dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction-a decision clearly not reaching the
merits. Until Hicks v. Miranda41 however, the precedential effect of a
Supreme Court's dismissal of an appeal for lack of a substantial federal
question was uncertain. In fact, such dismissals were often ignored.
For example, in Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co.,42 the
Court dismissed an appeal for insubstantiality, thereby apparently up-
holding the validity of the New York "long-arm" statute.' 3 Yet when
the case is cited in Hart and Weschsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System, one of the most comprehensive casebooks ever pub-
lished, the reference is to Justice Goldberg's denial of a stay, with no
reference to the Court's opinion dismissing the appeal." Clearly the
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
40. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
41. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
42. 382 U.S. 110 (1965), rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 1002(1965).
43. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. § 302(a)(2) (McKinney 1963) provided, inter alia, that
A Court may exercise jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary. . . as to a cause of
action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the same man-
ner as if he were a domiciliary of the state, if, in person or through an agent, he:
(2) commits a tortious act within the state ...
The Supreme Court had not previously dealt specifically with this question, although
some state courts had spoken. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 22 Il1. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE
644-53 (1965). The relevant decisions of the Court are discussed in Mr. Justice
Goldberg's order denying a stay in the case. See Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid
Co., 382 U.S. 1002 (1965).
44. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 627, 631, 1554 (2d ed.
1973). The same omission occurs in J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL
10
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authors did not believe such a dismissal was of precedential weight.
Former Justices Goldberg and Clark have indicated that they never
viewed these dismissals as dispositions on the merits.45
The Court ostensibly provided an answer to the question of the
precedential value of dismissals for insubstantiality on appeal in Hicks
v. Miranda.46 In Hicks, the Court stated that cases dismissed for lack
of a substantial federal question constitute dispositions on the merits.4
It also noted in a disingenuous understatement that "[a]scertaining the
reach and content of summary actions may itself present issues of real
substance.' 4 The Court had further opportunity to clarify the impact
of a dismissal in Mandel v. Bradley.' In Mandel, the Court wrote:
PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 122-23 (1968). The second edition of F. JAMES,
JR. & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 630-34 (2d ed. 1977), makes no reference to
Rosenblatt even though the validity of "long arm" statutes is discussed.
45. Mr. Justice Goldberg mentioned this to the author during a conversation.
Mr. Justice Clark's view is set forth in his concurring opinion in Hogge v. Johnson, 526
F.2d 833, 836 (4th Cir. 1975): "During [the eighteen terms in which I sat] . . .[such
dismissals] received treatment similar to that accorded petitions for certiorari and were
given about the same precedential weight." Some political scientists even after Hicks
still believe such a dismissal is to be given the same weight as a denial of certiorari. See
R. FUNSTON, A VITAL NATIONAL SEMINAR 26 (1978).
46. 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
47. The evolution of such an unequivocal rule exemplifies a bootstrapping tech-
nique frequently used in legal reasoning. Professor C. Wright supported such a rule in
1963 by citing, inter alia, R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 164
(3d ed. 1962), with a "cf." citation to R. ROBERTSON & F. KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 104 (R. Wolfson & P. Kurland eds.
1951). C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 431 (1963). To the same effect, see his
1970 second edition at 495. Robertson & Kirkham note that "the memorandum dis-
missals by the Supreme Court for want of a substantial federal question often consti-
tute undisclosed determinations on the merits." ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, JURISDIC-
TION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES at 104. In Hicks v. Miranda,
the Court cites, inter alia, C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 495 (2d ed. 1970).
Professor Wright in his latest edition now relies solely on Hicks. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS 551 n.25 (3d ed. 1976). Justice White, author of the Court's opinion
in Hicks v. Miranda, appears uncertain concerning the doctrine he elaborated. In his
dissent from the dismissal for lack of a substantial federal question in Thomas v. New
York, - U.S. ---., 100 S. Ct. 197 (1979), he expresses concern about leaving lower
courts in conflict. If the dismissal is on the merits, as he suggested in Hicks, the conflict
is resolved.
48. 422 U.S. at 344.
49. 432 U.S. 173 (1977).
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Summary affirmances and dismissals for want of a substantial federal
question without doubt reject the specific challenges presented in the
statement of jurisdiction and do leave undisturbed the judgment ap-
pealed from. They do prevent lower courts from coming to opposite con-
clusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those
actions. 10
Despite the ostensibly clear principle enunciated in Mandel, the
significance of such dismissals remains an enigma. For example, in
Jones v. Louisiana5 1 the Court's rationale for the dismissal is a tene-
brific Zuckerkandlite. 52 Jones followed Duncan v. Louisiana,53 which
held the sixth amendment's guarantee of jury trial applicable to a state
trial where the offense carried a maximum two-year sentence. But
Jones came before De Stefano v. Woods, 4 which determined that the
Duncan doctrine was hybrid prospective. From the Court's decision to
hear De Stefano, it would seem the Court in Jones was applying a
principle relevant to the type of offense to which the sixth amendment
right to jury trial attaches and not a prospectivity issue. But because
Jones involved offenses, one of which resulted in a one-year sentence,
and the Court shortly thereafter applied the jury trial provision to of-
fenses carrying sentences of more than six months in Baldwin v. New
York, 55 certainly the federal question concerning that issue was sub-
stantial at the time of Jones.
Curiously enough, the Court in Baldwin not only fails to mention
Jones, but also states: "In this case, we decide only that a potential
50. Id. at 176. The Court continues to place emphasis on the jurisdictional state-
ment. See McKeesport Area School Dist. v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Educ., - U.S. -,
100 S. Ct. 2953 (1980). Because the jurisdictional statement is prepared by counsel
seeking review, the statement could tend to overstate the issues presented.
51. 392 U.S. 302 (1968).
52. Dr. Zuckerkandl, a creation of Robert Hutchins, had as his chief goal reduc-
ing communication to a minimum. A typical Zuckerkandlite was provided by President
Eisenhower's response to a question about integration in Southern schools: "However,
when the Federal Court gets into the thing, you have got a judicial thing, or I mean a
legal thing, that I have gone as far as I know the answer." Hutchins, Living Without
Guilt, 18 CENTER DIARY 37, 38 (May/June 1967).
53. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
54. 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
55. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
1 22 Nova Law Journal
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sentence in excess of six month's imprisonment is sufficiently severe by
itself to take the offense out of the category of 'petty.' None of our
decisions involving this issue have ever held such an offense 'petty.' "56
The Supreme Court of Louisiana also did not find precedent from the
high Court to aid it in arriving at a decision.57
Trying to apply the Mandel test to the Duncan, Jones, and Bald-
win trilogy highlights the cacophony of the Court's statement. The ju-
risdictional statement in Jones sets forth the following question
presented: "Do state statutes that deny the right to trial by jury in a
prosecution for Possession of Burglar Tools, where a one year prison
term may be and is actually imposed, violate the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution?"' 8 If the Court, in its
dismissal of Jones, held no right to a jury trial exists where a sentence
of one year is imposed, how, then, did Baldwin, a case involving the
imposition of six month's imprisonment, warrant an extensive opinion?
Was the Baldwin issue not already decided by the dismissal of Jones?
The question naturally arises whether the Court really meant that
dismissals for want of a substantial federal question necessarily "with-
out doubt reject the specific challenges presented in the statement of
jurisdiction." 59 Can the Supreme Court possibly mean what it says
when it dismisses a case presenting truly fundamental issues? Potts v.
Kentucky 0 illustrates the difficulty of taking the Court's words
literally.
Potts was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. The
Court cites the reader to the lower court's decision in Potts v. Kentucky
for the facts and opinion. At the designated page appears a table indi-
cating that the Kentucky opinion in Potts is unreported."1 The jurisdic-
56. 399 U.S. at 69 n.6 (emphasis supplied).
57. State v. Jones, 251 La. 431, 204 So. 2d 775, 778-79 (1967), appeal dis-
missed, 392 U.S. 302 (1968).
58. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 2, Jones v. Louisiana, 392 U.S. 302
(1968).
59. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977).
60. 435 U.S. 919 (1978).
61. The relevant portion of the unreported decision of the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky reads: "The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel has not been presented
to the trial court and cannot be raised for the first time in this court." Potts v. Com-
monwealth of Kentucky, No. 76-257 (Ky. Ct. App. July 8, 1977). It is not unusual to
find significant Court opinions involving unpublished lower court opinions. See, e.g.,
23 115:1980
13
Lewis: Is The Supreme Court Creating Unknown And Unknowable Law? The Ins
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
tional statement, however, frames the issue before the Court. 2
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 392 U.S. 657, 657 (1968), vacating an unpub-
lished opinion of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeal and remanding "for further
consideration in light of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. . .," which is located at 392
U.S. 409 (1968). Predictably the Virginia court found Jones distinguishable, Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 209 Va. 279, 163 S.E.2d 588 (1968), and the United
States Supreme Court again reversed. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S.
229 (1969). The increase in unpublished opinions is not nearly as disturbing as the
emergence of no citation rules. See Ky. R. Civ. P. 76.28(4)(c) (1977). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Local Rule 11 provides:
"Decisions of this court designated as not for publication should never be cited to this
court or in any material prepared for this court. No such decision should be published
unless this rule is quoted at a prominent place on the first page of the decision so
published."
Justice Stevens comments on this development:
A rule limiting the number of opinions to be published in the official reports is
justifiable and desirable as long as the opinions are available to the Bar and to
the public. For I am well aware of the fact that appellate judges-including
myself-write more than is necessary. But censorship in the form of a no-citation
rule is fundamentally different from a decision not to publish certain opinions
generally.
Address by Justice Stevens to the Illinois State Bar Association's Centennial Dinner:
Some Thoughts and Reflections on the Litigation Explosion and How It Has Affected
the Courts' Ability to Cope with the Problem, reprinted in ILL. B.J. 508, 510 (1977).
The no-citation rules have raised interesting challenges. In Carter v. United States, 590
F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977), rehearing denied, 434
U.S. 882 (1977), the petition for rehearing raised the question:
Whether the existence and application to Petitioner's case of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's Local Rule I 1 (rendering the Appellate
Court's decision in Petitioner's case of no precedential value whatsoever) denied
Petitioner his right to an appeal in accordance with the Federal Statutes and the
Constitution of the United States since: (1) Local Rule I1 is substantive and
therefore not authorized by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or 28
U.S.C., Section 2071; (2) Local Rule 11 operates to produce non-justiciable deci-
sions inconsistent with the case or controversy requirement of Art. III of the
Constitution of the United States; (3) Local Rule 11 on its face and as applied in
Petitioner's case, constitutes invidious discrimination in violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and (4)
Local Rule 11 unconstitutionally infringes the rights of expression and press
guaranteed by the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Petitioner's Brief for Rehearing at 2-3, Carter v. United States, 434 U.S. 882 (1977).
62. The jurisdictional statement indicates that the specific challenge raised was:
Do Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure 10.06 and 12.54 and their application
124 Nova Law Journal 5:1980
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The facts presented in the jurisdictional statement reflect a shock-
ing lack of effective assistance of counsel at trial. The defense attorney
committed innumerable -blunders at the defendant's trial for rape.
Among other errors, the trial lawyer failed to interview witnesses,
failed to introduce discovery motions, failed to introduce jury instruc-
tions and failed to use damaging statements made by the alleged rape
victim to impeach her credibility.6"
The court of appeal refused to listen to appellant's arguments be-
cause the issue of ineffective legal assistance was not raised in the trial
court. Discretionary review sought on the basis of a due process viola-
tion was denied by the Kentucky Supreme Court. A strict application
of the rule established in Mandel leads to the conclusion that the chal-
lenges made in Potts, i.e., violations of procedural fairness, were re-
jected by the high Court.6" Does this dismissal, as Mandel explicitly
states, prevent lower courts from arriving at a different result when the
next similar factual situation arises? If the answer is yes, then the
Court displays a callous disregard for the fair trial rights of a
defendant.
If jurisdictional statements are the guide to determining the mean-
ing of these dismissals, the general inaccessibility of these jurisdictional
statements is of considerable concern. Mutatis mutandis, we can apply
Justice Jackson's sage advice concerning the interpretation of the
Miller-Tydings Act in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp..65
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Kentucky, as
stated in the case of Caslin v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 491 S.W.2d 832
(1973), wherein the courts held that any appellant may not raise the question of
ineffective assistance of counsel unless the counsel who is being alleged ineffec-
tive raises the question of his own ineffectiveness, or else the question will be
forever barred, violate the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and therefore vitiate the
conviction of the appellant.
Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 4, Potts v. Kentucky, 435 U.S. 919 (1978). The
status of the Potts dismissal is apparently understood by the Kentucky Supreme Court
(see Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 580 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Ky. 1979)), but not by some
commentators. See Collier, Criminal Procedure, 68 Ky. L.J. 655, 678 n.120 (1980).
63. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 5-6, Potts v. Kentucky, 435 U.S. 919
(1978).
64. See note 61 supra.
65. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
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There are practical reasons why we should accept whenever possible the
meaning which an enactment reveals on its face. Laws are intended for
all of our people to live by; and the people go to law offices to learn what
their rights under those laws are. Here is a controversy which affects
every little merchant in many States. Aside from a few offices in the
larger cities, the materials of legislative history are not available to the
lawyer who can afford neither the cost of acquisition, the cost of housing,
or the cost of repeatedly examining the whole congressional his-
tory. . . .To accept legislative debates to modify statutory provisions is
to make the law inaccessible to a large part of the country.66
Frequently the Court and lower courts appear oblivious to the in-
substantial question dismissals. Fairly representative is the striking
omission in the Supreme Court of Ohio's opinion in Primes v. Tyler,6 7
which held that the Ohio guest statute violated the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause. The opinion rested on both state and
federal provisions. Certainly as to the federal provision, the overriding
authoritative law comes from the Court.
Prior to writing the opinion in- Primes, the justices of the Supreme
Court of Ohio should have been aware of Cannon v. Oviatt, 8 a case
dismissed by the Court for lack of a substantial federal question. The
jurisdictional statement in Oviatt indicated that the question presented
was:
Whether the Utah guest statute, section 41-9-1, Utah Code Annotated
(1953) is unconstitutional in that it violates the equal protection guaran-
tee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in
creating classifications among those permitted and those denied recovery
for negligently inflicted injuries that bear no fair, substantial or rational
relation to the purposes of the legislation. 9
The Ohio court did cite the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in Can-
66. 341 U.S. at 395, 396-97 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
67. 43 Ohio St. 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975).
68. 419 U.S. 810 (1974).
69. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 3, Cannon v. Oviatt, 419 U.S. 810
(1974). Shortly after this, jurisdictional statements began to appear in microform,
making them more accessible. More libraries now have the relevant material. Compare
R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 10-15 (3d ed. 1962) with R.
STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 1158-72 (5th ed. 1978).
126 Nova Law Journal 5:1980 1
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non v. Oviatt,70 but completely ignored the affirmance through dismis-
sal by the Court, even though a later Court decision is cited.7 1
The Court itself generally acts as though the dismissals are nonex-
istent, but often enough relies on them to require lawyers and courts to
become knowledgeable about their potential import.7 2 Justice White's
opinion, in Patterson v. New York, 7 provides a striking example of the
significance of a dismissal. In Patterson, New York law required a de-
fendant in a prosecution for second-degree murder to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of extreme emo-
tional disturbance to reduce the charge to manslaughter. The
constitutional question presented was whether the New York rule was
consistent with the doctrine enunciated in Mullaney v. Wilbur,7 ' which
established that the state must prove all elements of a criminal offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice White, in rejecting the defendant's
Mullaney argument, reasoned:
Subsequently [after Mullaney], the Court confirmed that it remained
constitutional to burden the defendant with proving his insanity defense
when it dismissed, as not raising a substantial federal question, a case in
which the appellant specifically challenged the continuing validity of Le-
land v. Oregon. This occurred in Rivera v. Delaware, an appeal from a
Delaware conviction which, in reliance on Leland, had been affirmed by
the Delaware Supreme Court over the claim that the Delaware statute
was unconstitutional because it burdened the defendant with proving his
affirmative defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. The
70. 43 Ohio St. at 203, 331 N.E.2d at 728 (1975).
71. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
72. In Hicks the Court was quite emphatic: "The three-judge court was not free
to disregard [an earlier dismissal for insubstantiality]." 422 U.S. at 344. The Court has
vacillated considerably on how much deference is due. It appears the Court views itself
not as constrained as it would be by a plenary opinion: "our decision not to review fully
the questions presented in Orsini v. Blasi [423 U.S. 1042 (1976), dismissing for lack of
substantiality] is not entitled to the same deference given a ruling after briefing, argu-
ment, and a written opinion .... Insofar as our decision is inconsistent with our dis-
missal in Orsini, we overrule our prior decision." Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
390 n.9 (1979). To the same effect, see Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 400
U.S. 173, 180-81 (1979). For an earlier case dealing with the precedential weight ac-
corded summary affirmances, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 (1974).
73. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
74. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
271
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claim in this Court was that Leland had been overruled by Winship and
Mullaney. We dismissed the appeal as not presenting a substantial fed-
eral question. Cf. Hicks v. Miranda. .... 75
With considerable prescience, Justice Brennan earlier observed, in
dissenting from the dismissal in Rivera v. Delaware,7 6 that
The Court's summary disposition of this case is especially inappropriate
since Hicks v. Miranda accords that disposition precedential weight. See
also Colorado Springs Amusements v. Rizzo. Given the transparent ero-
sion of Leland by Winship and Mullaney, the question whether Leland
has continuing validity surely merits full briefing and oral argument.7 7
It is not unusual for the Court to base all or part of its decisions in
cases given plenary consideration on prior memorandum dismissals for
the lack of substantiality.7 8 Once counsel and lower courts become
more knowledgeable about the Court's use of these dismissals, we can
anticipate more frequent incorporation of these precedents into briefs
and lower court opinions.
Conclusion
The Court's extensive use of dismissals for lack of a substantial
federal question (in the post-Hicks v. Miranda era)79 constitutes a seri-
75. 432 U.S. at 205 (citations omitted).
76. 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
77. 429 U.S. at 880 (citations omitted).
78. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm., 424 U.S. 645, 646
(1976); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 443 (1979); Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664,
686 n.6 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
79. During the 1974-1978 terms, the Court dismissed 357 appeals for lack of
substantial federal question, an average of approximately 71 cases per term. There
were 85 dismissals during the 1979 term.
Dismissal for Lack of
Term Substantial Federal Question
1974 66
1975 77
1976 60
1977 81
1978 73
1979 85
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ous intrusion into the Rule of Law. A brief survey of this practice
reveals that the Court uses this technique in a significant number of
cases to generate "law" that is generally unknown-if not unknow-
able-but that is binding precedent for all except Supreme Court Jus-
tices who can selectively overrule, ignore, or cite these dismissals at
their discretion. Indeed, just the description of the practice sounds like
the antithesis of a Rule of Law. The cost, then, must be counted as
high for the Court as an institution that depends so much for its power
and effectiveness on continued perception by the legal profession and
the public that its decision making involves a process of reasoned elabo-
ration in which cases are resolved according to neutral principles.
To revert to the earlier pre-Hicks position that such dismissals,
like denials of certiorari, are not of precedential weight would cost the
Court nothing in terms of consistency or guidance to the litigants and
public.
This position would also appear to be more consistent with its ju-
risprudence concerning article III jurisdiction. Why the Court contin-
ues like Caligula to adhere to this pernicious practice defies explana-
tion. Case dismissed FOR LACK OF A SUBSTANTIAL
QUESTION.
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